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A 1962 RAND Corporation study on teacher pay described teacher salary schedules in the 
following way: 
It is the number of years at college that counts, not whether the college was the best or the worst; 
it is the number of graduate courses taken, not their excellence or usefulness or (usually) their 
relevance. Finally, the pertinent factor is how long the teacher has taught, not how well. And the 
difficulties of recruiting or retaining particular teaching skills are completely irrelevant in such 
a schedule. For any given set of “professional qualifications” so defined, a teacher’s salary is 
uniquely determined by reference to the schedule.
Nearly four decades later, this remains an accurate description of how the vast majority of public 
school teachers are compensated. No matter which grades or subjects or students they teach, no 
matter how well or poorly they perform, teachers are paid according to their school district’s 
“single salary schedule,” a system of pay steps and ladders that ensures that teachers with the 
same years of experience and education level (say, a master’s degree) receive the same salary.
Illustration by John Weber. 
By thoroughly standardizing teacher pay, 
the single salary schedule suffers from a 
major flaw: It deprives the managers of 
public schools of the authority to adjust 
an individual teacher’s pay to reflect both 
his performance and market realities. For 
instance, many schools have trouble 
recruiting teachers in fields that command 
high salaries outside of education, such as 
mathematics and the sciences. The 
rigidities of the single salary schedule 
prevent them from addressing this 
shortage in the obvious way—by raising 
pay in these specialties. The result: Public 
schools are often forced to hire 
unqualified candidates to teach math and 
science courses. Likewise, few school 
systems provide extra compensation to 
teachers who work with the most severely 
disadvantaged students. Without pay 
incentives to keep them in the toughest 
jobs, veteran teachers often use their 
seniority to transfer to the most attractive 
schools in the system, leaving the 
neediest children to be taught by the 
youngest and most inexperienced teachers.
Moreover, most public schools either 
have never tried or have given up on 
compensation schemes that reward 
teachers for performance, such as merit 
pay. The conventional wisdom holds that 
merit pay is simply not suited to teaching: 
It is too hard to judge individual contributions to output,too difficult to identify what teachers 
must do to improve. But these arguments ignore the widespread use of performance incentives in 
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a variety of other occupations that also involve complex relationships between individual 
performance and organizational outcomes. More than 90 percent of large public and private 
sector organizations use such incentives. Even teachers recognize that it is unjust to pay highly 
effective instructors the same as mediocre ones. In a recent Public Agenda survey, 69 percent of 
new teachers said it was a good idea to “pay higher salaries to teachers who prove to be highly 
effective in improving academic performance.” The limitations of the single salary schedule have 
prompted policymakers to search for alternative ways of compensating teachers. The most 
widely heralded reform, and the one most likely to garner the support of teacher unions, is 
knowledge- and skills-based pay, a compensation scheme in which teachers qualify for higher 
salaries by demonstrating their mastery of various competencies.
Knowledge- and skills-based pay, however, is largely untested. Such reforms have not been 
widely implemented in private industry.Of 19,016 North American companies surveyed in 1996 
about their compensation schemes, only 54 reported using competency pay practices. If the only 
alternative is to continue with the single salary schedule, introducing differentials based on 
demonstrated competencies will probably accomplish some good. But it falls considerably short 
of the more fundamental changes that a more open, competitive market for educational services 
would foster.
External Assessments
Knowledge- and skills-based pay plans rely mainly on external evaluators and assessments to 
judge whether an individual teacher has reached certain levels of competency. Teachers can earn 
higher salaries by demonstrating proficiency on various tests and tasks deemed important to good 
teaching. Such a structure could entirely replace the single salary schedule. But, in practice, it is 
more likely that knowledge- and skills-based pay would supplement traditional rewards for 
education and experience.
A complete overhaul of teacher compensation is unlikely to happen unless public 
education becomes more sensitive to market pressures.
The professional benchmarks for this new approach to teacher compensation include content 
tests such as the Educational Testing Service’s (ETS) PRAXIS II and performance-based 
assessments such as the PRAXIS III test and the National Board for Professional Teaching 
Standards’ certification process, which purports to identify “master” teachers who have attained 
high levels of expertise in their fields. The National Board’s process has proved especially 
popular; many states and school districts offer teachers $5,000 to $10,000 bonuses for becoming 
“board certified.”These national benchmarks may be augmented with instruments developed at 
the state and local level to assess teachers’knowledge and ability.These assessments have a 
common feature: Teachers are evaluated not by their immediate supervisors but by outside 
parties (employees of the ETS, scorers for the National Board). This raises an obvious question: 
Can these outside parties learn as much about an individual teacher’s competency and work ethic 
as someone who works with and observes that teacher day after day?
The National Board’s certification process is the prototype for many of these external 
assessments. It relies heavily on teacher portfolios, which contain samples of student work 
together with the teacher’s commentary and lesson plans. The goal of the National Board’s 
process is to ascertain how well teachers diagnose and respond to students’ learning problems. 
But the National Board requires teachers to submit only one assignment by two students of their 
choosing. The teachers write their commentaries on the purpose and effectiveness of the lesson 
well after the fact. With all the benefits of hindsight, candidates for board certification can 
portray themselves as more perceptive and effective than they actually were. Teachers also 
submit two brief videotapes of their teaching, but the choice of lessons is left to them. Moreover, 
interpreting the tapes requires background information about the class and the purposes of the 
lesson—information that is supplied, once again, by the candidates. The fact that many 
applicants for board certification now receive coaching on how to prepare their portfolios raises 
additional questions about the authenticity of the material they submit. Yet the National Board’s 
evaluators have no data from independent sources with which to verify the accuracy of the 
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statements in a teacher’s commentary.
Nevertheless, the Board often does manage to learn something about teaching performance from 
the portfolios. Despite having every opportunity to portray themselves favorably, some teachers 
still fail the Board’s assessment. Other candidates are so outstanding that they are unlikely to 
have faked their performance or benefited unduly from coaching. The problem is the great 
middle, where the difference between successful and unsuccessful candidates may have much to 
do with coaching and with access to successful portfolios that can serve as templates for one’s 
own. It is worth noting that passage rates for board candidates have risen steadily as the number 
of facilitators and support groups for board candidates has multiplied. More than half of 
candidates are now rated “accomplished,” up from roughly one-third in the first year.
The National Board’s certification process is susceptible to cheating and coaching mainly 
because it relies on only a momentary glimpse into a teacher’s skills and habits.It indicates (at 
best) only what teachers know how to do, not whether they actually put their knowledge into 
practice. This is of special concern in the evaluation of veteran teachers, who experience varying 
degrees of disillusionment and burnout. Whether these instructors know how to teach is only part 
of the story. Of equal importance is whether they summon the energy and will to apply that 
knowledge day after day.
Managers Who Manage
Compared to outside evaluators such as the National Board, a teacher’s supervisor (such as a 
principal or department head) has a wealth of information about teaching performance. The 
supervisor can visit the classroom at times of her choosing, rather than the teacher’s (unless 
unscheduled observations are prohibited by the teachers contract). The number and duration of 
these visits are not limited. Students’ standardized test scores and the opinions of parents and 
other teachers can also be taken into account. Local supervisors know their teachers personally. 
They see which teachers interact well with colleagues at faculty meetings, who remains in the 
building late to help students,who devotes time and energy to extracurricular activities,and so on. 
There is nothing the Board knows from a teacher’s portfolio that the building principal, the 
department head, or other immediate supervisors cannot learn. And there is much that good 
supervisors will know that the National Board cannot hope to find out.
It should be noted that not all schools rely on external evaluation to administer their knowledge- 
and skills-based pay plans. But to the extent that schools rely not on supervisor judgment but on 
“peer review,” many of the same concerns arise. Peer-review procedures too often let teachers 
know in advance when they will be observed. They also too often include a checklist of approved 
behaviors that the teachers know they are to exhibit, and a “successful” rating usually means they 
will not be evaluated again for years to come. When present, these procedures render the validity 
of the peer-review process suspect. In addition, as peer evaluators are not held accountable in any 
broader sense for school performance, their motivation is unclear: What is at stake for them in 
passing or failing a fellow teacher?
Why, then, rely on external assessments or internal peer review rather than evaluation by 
supervisors? The reply most often given is two-fold: 1) Local administrators often cannot or do 
not use the information available to them to form accurate assessments of performance; and 2) 
Even when supervisors know who the better teachers are, they lack the authority to adjust pay 
accordingly.
If nothing can be done to address these legitimate concerns, then the argument in favor of 
knowledge- and skills-based pay is fairly uncontroversial. Better to pay teachers for their 
knowledge and skills than to continue the traditional practices represented by the single salary 
schedule. But this leaves some crucial problems unaddressed. By focusing solely on teacher 
qualifications, knowledge- and skills-based pay fails to compensate teachers for working with the 
most disadvantaged students. Teachers accepting the hardest assignments in their systems will 
continue to be paid on the same basis as others. It also fails to let teacher pay respond to the 
overall supply and demand for teachers in different subject areas, such as math and science.
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While some school districts have defined competencies to include knowledge of subjects in 
which qualified teachers are in short supply,advocates of pay for knowledge and skills more 
often stress that all teachers can aspire to the status of “master teacher” regardless of the subject 
they teach. Given widespread teacher resistance to salary differentiation, this is not likely to 
change as long as the support of teacher unions is required to implement such policies. The 
Public Agenda survey of new teachers found more than half opposed to salary reforms that 
would “pay more money to teachers in subjects like math and science, where there are severe 
shortages.” Similar views have been reported in other teacher surveys.
Knowledge- and skills-based pay represents a step in the right direction. More fundamental 
changes are necessary, but the fact is that a complete overhaul of teacher compensation is 
unlikely to happen without broader changes in the market for educational services. A comparison 
of compensation policies in public and private schools reveals how much more can be 
accomplished when schools operate in a competitive environment that requires them to respond 
to market conditions and when impediments to managerial flexibility are removed.
Teacher Compensation in Private Schools
Administrators of private schools function in an economic and political context that characterizes 
only a small minority of public schools. First, as a rule each private school sets its own wage 
scale. Second, private schools are subject to powerful competitive incentives, as their students 
can remove both themselves and their tuition dollars if they are unhappy with the services being 
provided. And third, most private school teachers are not represented in collective bargaining.
School-based wage setting. A typical public school teacher works in a wage-setting unit (i.e., the 
school district) that is more than 100 times larger than the wage-setting unit of a typical private 
school teacher (the school). As shown in Figure 1, school districts that enroll more than 10,000 
students employ an average of 1,483 teachers each (and together employ 46 percent of all public 
school teachers). In other words, a large share of public school teachers are employed in wage-
setting units with well over 1,000 teachers. The average private high school, by contrast, 
employs only 27 teachers. Private elementary schools are smaller still, averaging only 11 
teachers. Interestingly, the new charter schools emerging within the public sector, with an 
average of 14 teachers each, more closely resemble the private sector than they do the traditional 
public sector.
The size of the wage-setting unit has important implications for personnel and compensation 
policy. First, salaries can adjust more readily to market realities. Consider, for example, the 
salaries paid to primary- and secondary-school teachers.In today’s market, schools need to pay 
more to secondary-school teachers than to those in the primary grades, where the supply of 
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comparably qualified instructors is greater. No such difference is seen in public school districts, 
of course. In the private sector, most elementary and secondary teachers work in different wage-
setting units. As a result, private elementary teachers earn 16 percent less on average than 
secondary-school teachers of comparable education and experience.
A similar phenomenon appears in special education. Private schools that specialize in teaching 
students with disabilities tend to be free-standing entities with the power to determine their own 
compensation policies. In the public sector, these schools usually lack such autonomy. The 
difference shows up in relative pay. The data in Figure 2, controlling for factors such as length of 
the school year and the location of the school, show that starting salaries in public schools 
devoted to the provision of special education are only 4 percent higher than elsewhere in public 
education. Private schools that specialize in special education pay their teachers 14 percent more.
Competitive incentives. Because private schools must attract tuition-paying families, they need to 
recruit and retain good teachers. Operating under these market pressures, private school 
administrators use performance incentives to a greater degree than do their public school 
counterparts. Although administrators have various notions of what counts as merit pay, survey 
data from the National Center for Education Statistics show that private, nonsectarian schools are 
at least twice as likely as public schools to use something they call “merit pay.” Many more 
teachers qualify for such bonuses than in public schools that use merit pay, and the impact on 
compensation is significantly greater. Although these surveys do not report the size of merit 
bonuses, statistical analysis of total compensation detects no discernible impact of merit pay on 
the salaries of public school teachers who claim they receive it. By contrast, merit-pay recipients 
in private schools earn, on average, approximately 10 percent more than nonrecipients. This 
private school differential, as shown in Figure 2, holds true after statistical adjustments have 
been made for the teachers’ education, years of experience, and the overall level of salaries at the 
school. Furthermore, inasmuch as these differentials are often built into the teacher’s base salary, 
the long-term impact on compensation can be quite substantial.
Private schools are also more likely to use differentiated pay to attract applicants in subject areas 
where the supply of skilled teachers is limited. Nearly a fifth of all private schools offer special 
incentives to recruit teachers of subjects like math and science, where qualified instructors are in 
short supply. This is nearly twice the rate of public schools. Figure 2 shows that the sharpest 
contrast lies in the size of the incentives. Private school teachers in such fields earn 8 percent 
more than teachers of comparable education and experience in other fields. In the public school 
systems that claim to use such incentives, statistical analysis again finds no significant impact on 
teacher pay.
http://www.educationnext.org/2001sp/16ballou.html (5 of 7)3/3/2005 9:32:26 AM
Let the Market Decide by DALE BALLOU AND MICHAEL PODGURSKY - Education Next - Spring 2001
Pay flexibility within the private sector is greater than these figures suggest. A third of all private 
schools do not even have a salary schedule. Among those that do, the traditional criteria—
academic credentials and teaching experience—explain less of the variation in teacher 
compensation than in the public sector, suggesting strongly that other factors are influencing pay.
All of these responses to the market are easier in the private sector because administrators are 
seldom subject to the constraints imposed by a collective-bargaining process. Unions have 
traditionally been opposed to differentiated pay for teachers of different subjects and to any form 
of merit pay that relies on a supervisor’s subjective assessment of teacher performance or 
objective measures of student achievement (e.g., standardized tests). In the absence of union 
pressure, private schools pay more for teachers at the secondary level, for math, science, and 
special education teachers, and for teachers of superior performance.
The contrast between the public and private sectors should not be overdrawn. Personnel policies 
in private schools are heavily influenced by professional norms and expectations established in 
the much larger public sector. Nonetheless, private-school policies indicate the direction we 
might expect teacher compensation to take if constraints on school administrators were lifted and 
educational success and failure were met with real rewards and sanctions.
In the end, knowledge- and skills-based pay continues the essential feature of the single 
salary schedule—paying teachers with equivalent credentials equally.
Not Interested
Advocates of knowledge- and skills-based pay are fond of saying that they are merely adopting 
policies that have already taken hold in private industry. This is not only a substantial 
exaggeration of trends in industry; it ignores the fact that the private schooling industry has 
shown little interest in external assessments of teachers’ knowledge and skills. For instance, 
National Board certificates have been awarded to 4,804 teachers, but only 48 of the awardees, 
less than 1 percent, work in private schools. (By comparison, more than 12 percent of the 
teaching force works in private schools.) Likewise, the trend in private industry has been not 
toward external assessments but toward increasingly comprehensive in-house reviews (known as 
360-degree reviews) that draw on information from peers, subordinates, and customers as well as 
immediate supervisors.
Pay for knowledge and skills is promoted as a flexible alternative to the single salary schedule. 
Yet this kind of flexibility has little to do with enabling administrators to assemble the staffs 
needed to accomplish their goals. In the end, knowledge- and skills-based pay continues a policy 
of rewarding teachers for possessing certain credentials. These credentials will be more varied 
than in the past. But the essential feature of the single salary schedule—paying teachers with 
equivalent credentials equally—is retained. Unless these compensation policies recognize market 
realities and offer higher salaries in shortage fields like mathematics, science, and special 
education—a step that is unpopular among teachers—all instructors within the wage-setting unit 
will be eligible to earn these credentials. While some teachers will end up earning more than 
others (as they do now), there will be no teaching jobs that pay more than others.
The lack of interest in the new compensation within the private sector should give us pause. 
Interest in knowledge- and skills-based pay appears strong only when there are impediments to 
more far-reaching reform of teacher compensation, such as powerful employee unions and weak 
mechanisms to further consumers’interests. The proponents of knowledge- and skills-based pay 
would have us believe that meaningful compensation reform can be accomplished without 
changing educational accountability and exposing schools to competitive forces that could alter 
the balance of power between students and parents on the one hand and school employees on the 
other. Perhaps they should be applauded for their pragmatism. Yet their efforts should not 
distract from fundamental reforms aimed at the underlying causes of salary rigidity.
–Michael Podgursky is a professor of economics at the University of Missouri–Columbia. Dale 
Ballou is a professor of economics at the University of Massachusetts Amherst. Their jointly 
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written Teacher Pay and Teacher Quality was published in 1996.
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